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In current practice, changes in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) are 
generally interpreted as reflecting the effort of discretionary fiscal policy. This paper 
shows, that such an interpretation is not a sufficiently accurate description of the 
behaviour of fiscal policy, and, in some cases, it may even conceal an important deficit 
bias. Specifically, as growth projections are an important building block of budgetary 
plans, optimism in forecasting growth, coupled with pervasive lags and inertia in the 
implementation phase of the budget, will result in a fiscal expansion, even in the absence 
of discretionary measures. In order to track down this kind of passive behaviour in the 
light of growth surprises or sanguine growth assumptions the traditional reading of the 
CAB needs to be adjusted. This is achieved by relaxing the benchmark assumption 
according to which, under unchanged fiscal policy, the deficit to GDP ratio is invariant to 
growth. An empirical application to public finance data of four large EU countries shows 
that  passive behaviour is an important element in practice, as forecast errors are 
significant in explaining changes in the CAB. Moreover, in some cases official growth 
forecasts appear to have a clear upward bias. 
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Cyclically-Adjusted Budget Balance, Potential Output, 
Forecast Accuracy, Policy Inaction. 
JEL classification: E61, H3, H6 
Acknowledgements: We thank Marco Buti, Antonio Cabral, Lucio Pench, Werner 
Röger, Peter Weiss and Ralph Wilkinson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. All remaining shortcomings are our own. Research assistance by Vito Ernesto 
Reitano is gratefully acknowledged. 
  
 
- 2 - 
Table of contents 
1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................3 
2.  THE CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCE AS 
INDICATOR OF DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY..........................................5 
2.1.  The mechanics of the CAPB .............................................................................5 
2.2.  Active versus passive fiscal policy....................................................................7 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE FISCAL POLICY........10 
3.1.  Accuracy of potential output growth forecasts................................................10 
3.2.  Discretionary fiscal policy and prediction errors............................................11 
4. DISCUSSION ...........................................................................................................12 







- 3 - 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Changes in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) are the most commonly used 
indicator of discretionary fiscal policy effort. Prominent examples are the IMF in its 
World Economic Outlook and the OECD in its Economic Outlook, where both 
institutions regularly comment on fiscal positions in structural terms associating changes 
in the structural deficit with discretionary policy interventions. Similarly, in its annual 
report on public finances in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and, more 
importantly, in assessing the stability programmes of the Member States under the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the European Commission gauges the 
discretionary effort of fiscal policy by the change in the CAB. 
The basic idea in using changes in the CAB as an indicator of discretionary fiscal policy 
is that, once the budget is purged of its cyclical component, any remaining difference 
across time should, by exclusion, signal the effect of active fiscal policy interventions. 
The concept is particularly appealing because of its simplicity and the possibility of 
replication.  
Various difficulties linked with the CAB have been discussed in the literature, the main 
references being Blanchard (1990), Chouraqui et al. (1990) Gramlich (1990) and, more 
recently, Braconier and Holden (1999) and Bouthevillain et.al. (2001). The main flaw of 
using the CAB as an indicator of discretionary fiscal policy, is that removing the effects 
of cyclical output fluctuations still leaves other possible sources of variation in the 
budget balance which cannot be termed discretionary. In particular, changes in the 
interest rate, a variable not controlled by fiscal authorities, can have significant effects on 
the budgetary position. To adjust for that non-policy element the focus has been shifted 
to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB).  
This paper argues that, even after shifting the focus to the CAPB, a more important 
adjustment is required. In particular, one needs to take into account the budgetary effect 
of over- or underestimating underlying growth in the planning phase of the budget. 
Expenditure plans are generally fixed a year in advance based on a forecast of revenues, 
which are typically linked to the projection for economic output. If output turns out lower 
than officially projected with no or very little adjustment of non-cyclical expenditure 
plans in the implementation phase of the budget, it would be misleading to describe the 
ensuing deterioration of the CAPB as being the result of discretionary fiscal. 
Consequently, changes in the CAPB can either be attributed to active fiscal policy 
interventions or, alternatively, to the inaction of fiscal policy in the event of lower or 
higher than projected underlying growth. In particular, in view of the inertia and 
complexity of the fiscal policy making process, including policy lags, it is safe to assume 
that contemporaneous corrections for growth surprises will be limited giving rise to what 
might be called passive fiscal policy.  
A further key issue addressed in this paper is to judge as to whether budgetary forecast 
errors simply reflect the intrinsic uncertainty of a non-deterministic world or constitute a 
deliberate strategy of fiscal policy to overestimate the level of economic activity in order 
to ex-ante embellish the structural fiscal position, while ex-post blaming weaker than 
expected growth.   
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The traditional reading of changes in the CAPB does not allow for the distinction 
between genuine discretionary fiscal policy and passive policy. In particular, changes in 
the CAPB are taken to be invariant with respect to growth, which can be true only if non-
cyclical expenditures always follow revenues. As a result of this neutrality assumption, 
any increase or decline in the CAPB is taken to exclusively yet mistakenly measure 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy.  
Splitting the CAPB into a component due to passive fiscal policy in the light of forecast 
errors and a component which is genuinely discretionary does not bear any difference on 
the actual outcome of the CAPB itself. Ex post, an improvement or deterioration of the 
CAPB is a purely factual issue. However, it is evident that the story of how the change in 
the CAPB was brought about and the conclusions to be drawn can be very different. In a 
context of fiscal consolidation, for instance, a deterioration of the CAPB generally 
triggers the conclusion that fiscal authorities should refrain from changing policy 
instruments that expand the non-cyclical deficit, while in some cases it would be more 
appropriate to ask for greater prudence in setting up budgetary plans or to flag the 
absence of prompt reactions to counter the effects of lower-than-projected potential 
growth.  
Although in a different context, the notion that changes in the CAPB may not simply 
reflect discretionary fiscal policy, is already present in the literature. The budgetary 
effect of growth is obtained as a sort of by-product while focusing attention on different 
issues. For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2001) and Perotti (2002) allow for growth to 
affect the CAPB when characterising the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output. Fatás 
and Mihov (2002) build a quantitative measure of discretionary fiscal policy by 
extracting both a cyclical component and some automatic growth effect from the 
observed series of the expenditure-to-output ratio. However, in both cases the effect of 
growth is neither quantified nor conceptually clarified. A step further in realising that 
discretionary policy has to be better specified is made by Buti and Van den Noord (2003) 
who analyse changes in the CAPB in relation with political elections. The common trait 
of these otherwise unrelated lines of research is that they give up the neutrality 
assumption underlying the traditional reading of changes in the CAPB. As a result, the 
structural budget balance is affected by underlying growth. 
The main problem in giving up the neutrality assumption is to find a convincing 
alternative. While it may not be difficult to recognise that an automatic link between non-
cyclical expenditures and revenues is not a realistic benchmark for describing unchanged 
fiscal policy, there is no clear-cut answer to the question of how non-cyclical expenditure 
may, under unchanged fiscal policy, be linked to the level of economic activity. This 
difficulty is generally well recognised and accepted in a context tightly linked to that of 
gauging discretionary fiscal policy changes, notably the problem of measuring the 
demand stimulus arising from discretionary changes in the fiscal position. Heller et. al. 
(1986) and Mackenzie (1989) review the issue, pointing out that any measure for 
assessing the thrust of fiscal policy will be conditional on the assumption of unchanged 
revenue and expenditure policy. Nonetheless, the same dependence is generally not 
acknowledged when using changes in the CAPB as an indicator of discretionary fiscal 
policy. The neutrality assumption is generally maintained. 
The present paper tries to look more carefully into the neutrality assumption underlying 
the current reading of the CAPB and explores the scope for alternative propositions. The 
main point is to show that because of the neutrality assumption changes in the CAPB do  
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not provide a sufficiently accurate description of the behaviour of fiscal policy, and, in 
some cases, may even conceal an important deficit bias.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section developes a more 
detailed discussion of the conceptual issue, focusing on the mechanics of the CAPB and 
the interplay between the neutrality assumption, forecast errors and budgetary inertia. A 
simple method for quantifying the budgetary effect of passive fiscal policy is offered. 
The third section of the paper investigates the empirical relevance of growth surprises in 
explaining the cyclically-adjusted budget balance. Based on budget data of the four 
largest EU countries, notably Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy, we first 
check the accuracy of official economic forecasts underpinning budgetary plans. After 
that, a regression analysis shows that prediction errors are statistically significant in 
explaining the CAPB. The fourth section discusses the results of the empirical analysis 
touching on possible elements of criticisms. The last section concludes the paper 
highlighting the importance of sound and prudent macroeconomic projections 
underpinning budgetary plans. 
2.  THE CYCLICALLY-ADJUSTED PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCE AS INDICATOR OF 
DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY 
2.1.  The mechanics of the CAPB 
The basic idea underlying the empirical application of the CAPB is to think of the actual 
primary budget balance b  as being the sum of two unobserved components: a structural 
and a cyclical. Expressing all budgetary variables in percentage of GDP this can be 
written as  










t t t y
y
y fp g y fp r g r b ε ε  
where  r  and g are total revenues and primary expenditures respectively. The cyclical 





scaled by the 
cyclical sensitivities of revenues and expenditures  r ε and  g ε . In a cyclical slowdown the 
cyclical component would typically cause the overall balance to deteriorate due to higher 
expenditure for unemployment benefits and lower tax revenues. The structural 
component of the budget balance, indicated by a superscript s, is taken to include two 
major determinants. The first is active fiscal policy, denoted as  t fp , the effect of which 
we actually want to isolate. The second determinant is potential output
P
t y  accounting for 
the fact that budgetary variables may generally depend on the level of economic activity.  
In a purely static context the structural component 
s
t b is simply and effectively obtained 
as a residual, by subtracting the cyclical component from the actual budget balance: 
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Once the cyclical element is correctly identified, the structural component necessarily 
follows. Possibly different determinants of the structural component are not relevant in 
this context. What matters is just the level of the underlying budgetary position.  
If one introduces the temporal dimension into the picture, further identifying assumptions 
need to be imposed to shed light on what determines the changes in the structural 
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The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (3) identify the two structural 
components, i.e. the policy-induced part and the effect of potential output variations 
respectively.
1 Assuming that, in analogy to changes in the output gap, the effect of 
potential output growth on the budget balance can be captured by separate sensitivity 
parameters, (3) can be rewritten as 
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In current practice, the overall change in the CAPB is taken to exclusively gauge the 
effort of discretionary fiscal policy actions. The underlying rate of growth is assumed to 
play no role. In terms of equation (4) this interpretation - the neutrality assumption 




r ε ε = , i.e. revenues and 
expenditures are assumed to have exactly the same response to changes in the level of 
                                                 
1 From a theoretical point of view equation (3) involves two important simplifications. It disregards any 
direct effect fpt may have on both actual and potential output. In the context of the prevailing 
macroeconomic paradigm, contractionary fiscal policy measures are generally assumed to have a 
negative effect, if not on the underlying rate of growth, then at least on the cyclical position of an 
economy. Hence equation (1) may be rewritten as  
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The likely response of actual output to fiscal policy measures will generally dampen the efficacy of any 
consolidation effort in the sense that a larger discretionary correction is required to achieve a specific 
nominal target. Nevertheless, equation (3) is justified by the problem at hand, i.e. decomposing observed 
changes in the budget. The aim of this work is not to determine ex ante the impact on output or the 
required size of a specific fiscal policy measure, but to identify different components in the observed 
changes of the budget balance given cyclical variations and underlying growth.   
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economic activity. At this point it needs to be stressed that this assumption of neutrality 
does not imply constant expenditure and revenue-to-GDP ratios over time.
2 The current 
reading of the CAPB is actually consistent with different trends in the size of 
government. It can imply either a rising or declining size of government depending on 
the numerical value of
P y
r ε . According to estimates provided by the OECD
3, tax 
elasticities range from 1.1 to 0.6 in EU member states, meaning that under unchanged 
fiscal policy the ratio of revenues to GDP would increase or decrease respectively.  
Equation (4) can also be interpreted as a special case of the more general problem of 
decomposing observed changes in the actual budget balance into a policy component and 
a component resulting from changes in the economic environment. The annex to this 
paper shows how the neutrality assumption underlying the CAPB can be derived as a 
particular parameter restriction of that general problem. It also shows that alternative 
parameter restrictions give rise to alternative indicators of discretionary fiscal policy 
examined and applied in the literature. 
2.2.  Active versus passive fiscal policy 
Once the neutrality assumption is questioned changes in the CAPB no longer provide a 
sufficiently accurate description of discretionary fiscal policy actions. They mistakenly 
lump together the component that Buti and Van den Noord (2002) call ‘genuine’ 
discretionary policy changes and changes resulting from passive behaviour on the side of 
fiscal authorities.  
The effect of passive fiscal behaviour originates in the diverging development of non-
cyclical expenditures and revenues in the event of higher or lower than expected growth. 
On the revenue side it is reasonable to assume that any downward/upward shift in the 
underlying rate of growth will automatically translate into a corresponding 
decrease/increase in governments’ receipts as, under unchanged fiscal policy, tax bases 
should bear a stable relationship with the level of economic activity. If this is the case, 
the elasticity remains the same from an ex-ante and an ex-post point of view.  
By contrast, one cannot take for granted the existence of a similar stable relationship 
between non-cyclical expenditure and the level of underlying activity. Admittedly, in the 
planning stage of the budget, the level of expenditure will generally be set by fiscal 
authorities in accord with projected revenues to the extent that the budget plan is derived 
from macroeconomic forecasts. However, any relationship between expenditure and 
economic activity that may hold from an-ex ante point of view will break down in the 
implementation phase of the budget once inertia comes into play. Any form of inertia on 
the side of fiscal authorities, be it due to institutional hurdles or due to political 
constraints, in the event of higher or lower than expected growth uncouples expenditure 
from the level of economic activity. In other words, over- or underestimating economic 
growth coupled with inertia in the implementation phase of the budget will result in a 
deterioration or improvement in the CAPB compared to plans, even if fiscal authorities 
                                                 
2 Heller et. al. (1986) and more recently von Hagen et. al. (2001) and von Hagen (2002) define neutral 
fiscal stance as the policy that keeps the revenue and expenditure-to-GDP ratios unchanged. 
3 Giorno et. al. (1995) and Van den Noord (2000), both published as OECD working paper, are the main 
references regarding tax elasticities for OECD countries.  
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do not take any discretionary policy measures. In terms of equation (4) this means that 
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The importance of inertia in economic policy has been extensively discussed and 
examined in the literature starting with the famous argument on “long and variable lags” 
by Milton Friedman (1959) later on reviewed by Blinder and Solow (1972) referring to 
fiscal policy and ranging to the more recent political economy type of explanations for 
inaction and delay as reviewed in Drazen (2000). Closely linked to the issue of budgetary 
procedures, Halleberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001) provide empirical evidence for 
fiscal policy inertia in the event of negative economic shocks.  
In principle, any forecast is, by its very nature, subject to uncertainty implying that 
projection and outturn will rarely coincide. Hence, as long as projections turn out to be 
unbiased and the root mean squared error is not exceptionally big, the effect of over or 
under predicting non-cyclical growth on the fiscal stance would have to be accepted as 
the natural consequence of a non-deterministic world. Conversely, a different conclusion 
is warranted if projections turn out, for example, to systematically overrate the 
underlying speed of the economy. In that case, the combination of prediction errors and 
inertia becomes a systematic part of fiscal performance, introducing a kind of deficit 
bias. This issue will be further discussed in the next section. 
The gain from distinguishing genuine discretionary policy changes from changes simply 
resulting from passive fiscal policy is twofold. First, it basically helps to get the story 
right. When assessing the fiscal stance of a country it may be key to understand the 
causes for an observed deterioration in the structural fiscal position in order to draw the 
correct conclusions. When faced with a fall in the CAPB, the current practice generally 
consists in linking the fiscal loosening with active fiscal policy measures such as tax cuts 
or increases in expenditure. In addition, depending on the fiscal framework, the fiscal 
loosening may be condemned coupled with the recommendation of refraining from 
further actions, when in reality it could be more appropriate to ask for greater prudence 
in setting up budgetary plans or to ask for prompt actions to counter the effects of growth 
surprises. Secondly, the distinction between genuine and passive fiscal policy can be an 
important element in the relatively recent but growing literature aiming at explaining 
fiscal behaviour by means of simple fiscal rules, analogous to the by now well 
established rules for monetary policy following Taylor (1993). Examples of this branch 
of literature are Gali and Perotti (2003), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002) and 
Taylor (2001). 
                                                 
4 While the assumption of neutrality may be justified in the planning phase of the budget, i.e. fiscal policy 
makers may plan to spend expected additional non-cyclical revenues, it will generally not hold in the 
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where the last term on the right hand side referring to budgetary plans can be taken to be zero.  
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A quantification of the budgetary effect of passive fiscal policy is complicated by the 
practical difficulty of measuring the degree of inertia in the implementation phase of the 
budget. For an accurate assessment one would have to know exactly if and how fiscal 
authorities react to variations in the economic outlook, when the reaction is likely to be 
different in each instance.  
Nonetheless, a rough estimate of the budgetary effect can be obtained by applying two 
working assumptions. Firstly, it can be assumed that in the event of growth surprises 
fiscal authorities do not adjust expenditure plans in the implementation phase of the 
budget. At first sight, the assumption of complete inertia may seem to be a strong one, 
but it may still be a reasonably good approximation taking into account the lags with 
which economic growth is measured, coupled with the slowness of the political process 
to design, approve and implement correcting measures. According to Halleberg, Strauch 
and von Hagen (2001), who carried out a survey on budgetary procedures in the EU, few 
countries have formal rules to cope with lower than expected revenues. In addition, the 
authors do not find a significant difference in the fiscal performance between member 
states with formal rules and member states without such rules. The second and less 
contentious working hypothesis would be to assume that the tax system is proportional or 
nearly proportional, implying a semi-elasticity 
P y
r ε equal to zero. In this case, any 
departure from projected GDP coupled with full inertia affects the CAPB-to-GDP ratio 
by an amount equal to the primary non-cyclical expenditure-to-GDP ratio for each 
percentage point of lower than expected GDP.
5  
This rule of thumb can also be applied in a purely ex-ante setting, when assessing the 
possible risks to the budgetary projections to changes in the economic growth scenario, 
i.e. when performing a sensitivity analysis. The assumption of complete inertia on the 
expenditure side of the budget produces a useful estimate of the discretionary adjustment 
required to meet the budgetary plans in case underlying growth, and hence revenues, fall 
short of or exceed prior projections.  
It should finally be stressed that the working assumption of complete inertia of non-
cyclical expenditure can reasonably be made only over the short term, say one year. Over 
the longer term and for countries with credible fiscal rules designed to cope with growth 
surprises in the implementation phase of the budget the working assumption would 
clearly not be justified, and different propositions would be required. However, the quest 
for an alternative and more realistic assumption other than complete inertia pushes open 
the door to the more fundamental and more difficult issue of the determinants of non-
cyclical expenditure. More specifically, to correctly identify discretionary policy changes 
in the budget one has to define the trend of non-cyclical expenditure in the absence of 
discretionary policy interventions, i.e. the behaviour of non-cyclical expenditure under 
                                                 
5 Assuming no adjustment on non-cyclical primary expenditure in the implementation of the budget means 
that the level of expenditure is taken to be fixed at the planned level. If in addition the tax system is taken 
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unchanged fiscal policy. In terms of equation (4) the problem is to find a value for 
P y
g ε . 
While there may be a relatively simple answer for certain expenditure categories, such as 
wages and salaries for public employees, it is less obvious and more complex for others, 
e.g. investment.  
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE FISCAL POLICY 
Following the conceptual discussion on how discretionary fiscal policy may be affected 
by inertia on the side of fiscal policy makers in the event of lower or higher than 
projected growth this section moves on to the empirical analysis of the issue. Attention is 
focused on the four largest EU Member States: Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and Italy.  
3.1.  Accuracy of potential output growth forecasts 
As a first step we look at the track record of potential output forecasts underlying official 
budgetary projections. Except for Germany, the macroeconomic scenario underpinning 
budgetary projections does not include an explicit forecast of potential output growth. 
However, estimates can be derived from forecasts of actual GDP figures using the HP-
filter. To start with, one-step ahead forecasts of potential output growth were derived 
from the annual budget plans for each year of the 1987-2003 period using the HP-filter. 
These forecasts were compared with “actual” potential output growth, which was 
estimated via the HP-filter on the complete historical real GDP series starting in 1960, 
plus the April 2003 Consensus forecast for 2003. 
Table 1 shows the key statistics obtained from the accuracy check. The analysis by 
country shows that  there is a clear tendency to overestimate the growth rate of potential 
output, notably in Italy and Germany. In the case of Italy, for instance, the official one-
step-ahead projection has - except for one year - always exceeded the actual outturn over 
the sample period. The average bias is around 0.6 percentage points per year. Similarly, 
the official German projections on average overrate the underlying speed of the economy 
by around half a percentage point each year, with the accuracy turning particularly bad in 
the second half of the 1990s when official forecasts were very slow to adapt to the 
marked deceleration in potential output growth. While the forecasts are slightly more 
accurate in the case of France, they also appear to embody some kind of structural 
optimism. A simple test using a normal distribution for the forecast errors shows that in 
these three cases the bias is statistically significant. 
Only the British Treasury seems to produce unbiased growth projections. The estimated 
average forecast error is smaller than one decimal point and is not significant at a 10% 
significance level. This is all the more remarkable as the official forecast of the Treasury 
for the period t+1 is generally presented in March of year t, whereas in the case of Italy, 
Germany and France the official forecast is presented later in the year. 
While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the reasons for the systematic 
upward bias in projecting the underlying speed of the economy, the most persuasive 
explanations probably involve political economy variables. Artis and Marcellino (1999) 
briefly address the strategic nature of growth forecasts underpinning official deficit 
projections. Buti and van den Noord (2003) examine the role of electoral cycles in euro 
area countries in the 1999-2002 period, showing that while countries systematically  
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overrate potential growth, there is no clear link to elections. A more formal line of 
explanation is provided by the models briefly referred to above in connection with 
Drazen (2000), explaining delay or inaction in economic policy as a consequence of 
heterogeneity and conflict of interest. A government facing political constraints either 
because of powerful vested interests, the public goods nature of the effects of fiscal 
policy or the ex-ante uncertainty about private benefits, could have an incentive to be 
overly optimistic on economic growth in the process of planning the budget in order to 
play down the need for fiscal consolidation. Ex-post any shortfall of economic growth 
and the ensuing deterioration of the fiscal position would then be typically attributed to 
unexpectedly adverse cyclical developments.  
The systematic upward bias in official growth forecasts could also result from a lack of 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy institutions. Following Artis and 
Allsopp (2003) a lower assessment of underlying growth on the part of the monetary 
authority vis-à-vis fiscal policy makers could lead the central bank to react whenever, 
faced with fiscal plans anchored on a higher estimate of underlying growth, growth 
appeared likely to rise above its own assessment of the growth potential. 
3.2.  Discretionary fiscal policy and prediction errors 
The second step of the empirical analysis consists in investigating the relationship 
between discretionary fiscal policy and prediction errors on non-cyclical growth. From 
the discussion in section 2 we expect that the combination of forecast errors and inertia 
should give rise to a negative relationship, with the CAPB deteriorating in the event 
potential growth turns out lower than expected. To check whether data support this 
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where capb is the cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance, d government debt, b the 
actual budget balance, all in percent of GDP. The expression in round brackets measures 
the size of the error on the one year out forecast for potential output growth. Equation (5) 
can be interpreted as the reduced form of a structural model in which fiscal policy 
makers target the government debt-to-GDP level d and there is inertia in correcting non-
cyclical expenditures in the implementation phase of the budget compared to budgetary 
plans. Moreover, equation (5) links up with the branch of research establishing empirical 
relevance of simple fiscal rules as in Bohn (1998), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 
(2002) or Gali and Perotti (2002).  
The estimation results for the individual countries are summarised in Table 2. The main 
point to highlight is that the figures would appear to confirm our a priori. In particular, 
the estimated values of the coefficient  2 β  turn out to have the expected negative sign, 
implying that, indeed, an optimistic prediction of potential growth affects the cyclically-
adjusted fiscal position. Moreover, the coefficients of the other two explaining variables, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio and the actual budget balance-to-GDP ratio, are also estimated to 
have the correct sign. However, due to the small number of observations (17 per country) 
test statistics are relatively poor. The estimated coefficients, especially those measuring 
the effect of prediction errors, are not uniformly significant across countries. 
Unsurprisingly, the lowest  2 β  coefficient is estimated for the UK, reflecting the  
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accuracy of the Treasury’s growth forecasts. In the case of Italy the negative sign of the 
estimated value of  2 β  is obtained after including a dummy for the first three years of the 
1990s. At the time, the Italian government was forced to enact restrictive fiscal packages 
to counter the risk of insolvency in a period of general economic slowdown, the degree 
of which was generally underestimated in the planning phase of the budget.
6 As a result, 
the budgetary effect of overestimating growth was masked by the strong fiscal 
consolidation.  
The estimation statistics improves considerably if country data are pooled. The 
corresponding results, displayed in the lower part of Table 2, corroborate the evidence 
emerging from the country-specific regressions. Most importantly, the estimated value of 
the common  2 β  coefficient is negative and significant at conventional significance 
levels.  
As the problem of inertia in the fiscal policy process is essentially due to the political 
difficulty of changing spending commitments, the regression exercise was repeated by 
replacing the cyclically-adjusted primary balance with non-cyclical primary expenditure, 
in order to check the robustness of our finding. The results are reported in Table 3. The 
specification of equation (5) is slightly modified to account for the high degree of auto-
correlation in the expenditure series. Apart from the constant, it only includes the 
prediction error and the lagged dependent variable. The role of the debt ratio and the 
actual budget balance in explaining non-cyclical primary expenditure is not statistically 
significant and regressions containing these terms are not presented here. 
The first point to note about the regression results is that the direction of the response of 
non-cyclical expenditure to prediction errors is in line with what we expect, i.e. optimism 
on growth in the phase of budgetary planning increases the non-cyclical expenditure-to-
GDP ratio. Again, except for the UK, the 2 β  coefficients estimated in the country-
specific equations have the correct sign and are significantly different from zero. The 
dummy related to the strong fiscal consolidation in Italy in the early 1990s is not 
statistically significant, as the correction was mainly attained by intervening on the 
revenue side. The role of prediction errors is confirmed in the pooled regression. The 
statistical properties of the pooled regression improve when excluding the UK, the 
country with the best track record in estimating potential output growth. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
The empirical link between the structural budget balance and the prediction errors 
detected in the previous section could be queried on at least two grounds. The first 
criticism would be to point out that such a link would actually pose no serious problem. 
The combined budgetary effect of over- or underestimating growth and fiscal policy 
inertia is not necessarily harmful to the extent that its impact on the fiscal stance is not 
pro-cyclical. In fact, prediction errors tend to be positively correlated with the output gap 
reflecting the lag with which forecasters tend to follow economic developments. The 
result would be a perhaps unintentional but still welcome stabilising effect on the 
                                                 
6 The risk of insolvency is highlighted by Corsetti and Roubini (1993) who perform statistical tests 
providing strong evidence against sustainability of fiscal policy at the time in Italy.  
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economy. However, to the extent that there is a systematic bias towards overestimating 
economic growth, as suggested by our analysis, the effect of the prediction errors would 
be to hamper fiscal consolidation by passing on the forecast bias onto the structural 
deficit. Especially in a period of economic slowdown, such as the one observed since 
2000 in the euro area, reluctance of fiscal policy makers to accept a lower growth 
potential, coupled with the inertia in the phase of the implementation of the budget, 
worsens the fiscal position in the medium term.  
In studying discretionary fiscal policy in the European Union Gali and Perotti (2003) 
identify, in addition to the automatic stabilisers, what they call a systemic or endogenous 
component in the structural surplus with a clear counter-cyclical pattern that tends to 
become stronger after the beginning of EMU in 1999. While the authors refrain from 
providing a story, probably because it would be audacious to argue that the ability to 
fine-tune the economy has improved in recent years, their findings are perfectly 
consistent with our proposition. The finding that discretionary policy has become more 
counter-cyclical after 1998, can, in our view, be explained by the increase in prediction 
errors in that period of time.  
The second element of criticism is more technical and concerns the possible endogeneity 
of the forecast errors on potential output growth with respect to changes in the CAPB. 
However, it is not clear in which direction the bias would tilt our regression results. 
Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects are both possible. In addition, policy makers 
should be generally aware of the real effects of fiscal policy actions and hence factor 
them into their growth forecasts. Any remaining systematic bias in the prediction error 
would imply that forecasts are based on the wrong model of the economy. 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has illustrated the caveat of using changes in the CAPB as an indicator of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In particular, it has been argued that the traditional reading of 
the CAPB can be blurred by the effects of over- or underestimating growth in the 
planning phase coupled with inertia in the implementation phase of the budget.  
An empirical application to budget data of the four largest EU economies showed that 
the effect is tangible and significant in practice. As a first point, the growth projections 
underlying the budget turn out to have a clear upward bias in Germany, Italy and France 
implying that, on average, the planned budget balance relies on too optimistic growth 
and, hence, revenue projections freeing, on an ex-ante basis, additional expenditure. With 
no or very little correction on the expenditure side, in the implementation phase of the 
budget, the upward bias in projected growth translates into a negative bias for the budget 
balance. Regression analysis investigating the relationship between the CAPB and 
prediction errors on non-cyclical growth corroborates our proposition. The CAPB 
deteriorates/improves when potential growth is over/underestimated. The link is 
statistically significant, except for the United Kingdom, which also happens to be the 
country where official growth forecasts are unbiased. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from our results is that greater attention has to be paid 
to the macroeconomic scenario underpinning budgetary plans. An observed change in the 
CAPB does not necessarily point to active fiscal policy actions such as tax increases or 
expenditure cuts. The change can simply result from passive behaviour when underlying  
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growth departs from plans. Although both active and passive fiscal policy may finally 
share the same outcome in terms of the observed fiscal position, the difference in how the 
change was brought about calls for different conclusions and recommendations. This is 
especially true in the context of a common fiscal framework such as the SGP, where 
continuous budgetary surveillance ranging from the ex-ante assessment of budget plans 
to the monitoring of the implementation of the budget is expected to foster fiscal 
discipline. In the light of the findings of this paper, the fiscal loosening observed in 
recent years in some of the large EU countries highlights the scope for paying more 
attention to the link between growth projections and the implementation of the budget, 
the effect of which is traditionally ignored in the traditional analysis of discretionary 
fiscal policy.   
 




Measured changes in the primary budget balance can be viewed as consisting of two 
unobserved components: one resulting from discretionary fiscal policy, the other due to 





t t b b b ∆ + ∆ = ∆   
where b is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio and the superscripts ν  and fp indicate 
the economic environment and fiscal policy respectively. As with most models involving 
unobserved variables, the decomposition is achieved by modelling at least one of the 
components identifying the second as a residual. Within the class of linear models, a 
general formulation of the decomposition A.1 has the form:  
A.2  t t t t t
fp
t Z H b b b b − ∆ = ∆ − ∆ = ∆
υ  
where Zt is a nx1 vector containing the rate of change between period t-1 and t of all 
economic variables affecting the budget. Likely candidates to be included in Zt are 
economic growth, possibly divided into potential and cyclical, changes in the rate of 
unemployment, the rate of inflation and demographic change. The 1xn vector Ht contains 
the semi-elasticities measuring the effect of the economic variables on the primary 
budget balance-to-GDP ratio. In most applications the semi-elasticities are taken to be 
constant through time. The inner product of H and Z measures the impact of the 
economic environment on the primary budget balance-to-GDP ratio in period t. 
Changes in the CAPB as well as other indicators of discretionary fiscal policy examined 
in the literature can be derived from A.2 by imposing restrictions on the vector H.  
Changes in the CAPB 
t t t t t t t t t
fp
t HZ b ygap ygap b ygap b ygap b b − ∆ = − − ∆ = ⋅ − − ⋅ − = ∆ − − − ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 ε ε ε  
In this case H and Zt are one-dimensional vectors containing respectively the sensitivity 
parameter ε  and the variation of the output gap. 
Blanchard fiscal impulse as outlined in Blanchard (1990) and applied, for instance, in 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) 
The discretionary component is obtained by calculating the budget balance that would 
have prevailed in time period t if the variables chosen to represent the economic 
environment had not changed compared with period t-1:  
() t t t t t t t t t t t
fp
t HZ b u T T b b u T T b b − ∆ = ∆ ∆ − ∆ = − ∆ ∆ − = ∆ − − − ) , / ( ] , [ ) , / ( ] , [ 1 1 1 β α β α  
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“Dutch measure” as in Chouraqui et. al. (1990) or von Hagen (2002) 
The discretionary component is obtained as the difference between the actual primary 
deficit and the primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditures had grown with 
potential GDP and revenues had grown with actual GDP. This assumes that, apart from 
cyclical variations in expenditure, the prevailing policy rule is to keep the revenue and 
expenditure ratio constant: 








t HZ b y y y y b b − ∆ = ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − − ) / / ( 1 1
, α . 
where H and Zt are one-dimensional vectors containing respectively 
c g, α , referring to the 
change in expenditure resulting from the cyclical component of GDP growth, and the 
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Table 1
Accuracy of potential and actual output growth forecasts underpinning public finance projections
1987-2003
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coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
Germany -2.61 (0.01) 0.12 (-0.01) 0.08 (0.75)
France -1.25 (0.05) 0.02 (0.16) 0.72 (0.00) -0.42 (0.10)
Italy -1.00 (0.26) 0.21 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 2.52 (0.00)
United Kingdom -0.17 (0.89) 0.20 (0.00) 0.73 (0.00)
No. of obs. 17
coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
-1.35 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.72 (0.00) -0.23 (0.05)
Germany -- - 1 . 6 1
France -- - 2 . 0 9
Italy 1.96 (0.00) -3.56
United Kingdom - - -1.90
beta 2  beta 3 beta 4.1 beta 4.2
beta 2  beta 3 beta 4.1 beta 4.2






Pooled regression D, F, I, UK
Country-specific regressions
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coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value
Germany 2.01 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00) -0.04 (0.13)
France 1.30 (0.01) 1.21 (0.00) -0.01 (0.66)
Italy 0.86 (0.17) 0.61 (0.00) -0.02 (0.11)
United Kingdom 0.80 (0.48) 0.77 (0.00) -0.18 (0.00)
No. of obs. 17
coeff. p value coeff. p value coeff. p value





No. of obs. 68
beta 2  beta 3 beta 4
Fixed effects






beta 2  beta 3
Table 3
Country-specific regressions
Pooled regression D, F, I, UK
Prediction error t
Cyclically-
adjusted primary 
expenditure t-1
Government debt t-1
beta 4